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Abstract— The main focus of this paper is to provide a global 
architectural solution built on the requirements for a reaction 
after alert detection mechanisms in the frame of Information 
Systems Security and more particularly applied to telecom 
infrastructures security. These infrastructures are distributed in 
nature, therefore the targeted architecture is developed in a 
distributed perspective and is composed of three basic layers: low 
level, intermediate level and high level. The low level is dedicated 
to be the interface between the main architecture and the 
targeted infrastructure. The intermediate level is responsible of 
correlating the alerts coming from different domains of the 
infrastructure and to deploy smartly the reaction actions. This 
intermediate level is elaborated using multi-agents system that 
provide the advantages of autonomous and interaction facilities. 
The high level permits to have a supervision view of the whole 
infrastructure, and to manage business policy definition. The 
proposed approach has been successfully experimented for data 
access control mechanism.  
Keywords- Security Policy, Multi-agents systems, Architecture, 
Distributed networks 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today telecommunication and information systems are 
more widely spread and mainly heterogeneous. This basically 
involves more complexity through their opening and their 
interconnection. Consequently, this has a dramatic drawback 
regarding threats that could occur on such networks via 
dangerous attacks. This continuously growing amount of carry 
out malicious acts encompasses new and always more 
sophisticated attacks techniques, which are actually exposing 
operators as well as the end user.  
State of the art in terms of security reaction is limited to 
products that detect attacks and correlate them with a 
vulnerability database but none of these products are built to 
ensure a proper reaction to attacks in order to avoid their 
propagation and/or to help an administrator deploy the 
appropriate reactions [1]. In the same way, [3] says that at the 
individual host-level, intrusion response often includes security 
policy reconfiguration to reduce the risk of further penetrations 
but doesn't propose another solution in term of automatic 
response and reaction. It is the case of CISCO based IDS 
material providing mechanisms to select and implement 
reaction decision. 
The realm of security management of information and 
communication systems is actually facing many challenges [5] 
due to the fact that it is very often difficult to: 
• Establish central or local permanent decision 
capabilities; 
• Have the necessary level of information;  
• Quickly collect the information, which is critical in 
case of an attack on a critical system node; 
• Launch automated counter measures to quickly block a 
detected attack; 
Based on that statements, it appears crucial to elaborate a 
strategy of reaction after detection against these attacks  
Our previous work around that topic has provided first 
issues regarding that finding and has been somewhat presented 
in [5]. This paper has proposed an architecture to highlight the 
concepts aiming at fulfilling the mission of optimizing security 
and protection of communication and information systems 
which purpose was to .achieve the following:  
• Reacting quickly and efficiently to any simple attack 
but also to any complex and distributed ones. 
• Ensuring homogeneous and smart communication 
system configuration, that are commonly considered 
and the main sources of vulnerabilities. 
One of the main aspects in the reaction strategy consists of 
automating and adapting policies when an attack occurs. It 
exists in the scientific literature a large number of policy’s 
definitions and conceptual model. For the purpose of that 
paper, we prefer the one provided by Damianou et al. in [14] 
that is “Policies are rules that govern the behavior of a system” 
(actors and sub components). The foreseen policy adaptation is 
considered as a regulation process. The main steps of the policy 
regulation are described in Figure 1, which shows the process 
that takes the business rules as input, and maps them into 
technical policies. These technical policies are deployed and 
instantiated on the infrastructure in order to have a new state of 
temporary network security stability adapted to the ongoing 
attack. This policy regulation is thereafter achieved in 
modifying/adding new policy rules to reach a new standing (at 
least up to the next network disruption) policy based on the 
observation of the current situation of the system. It must be 
specified that this regulation process rely also on policies 
adaptation to a specific context. Those contexts and the 
modeling of concepts of org, role, activity, view are explained 
in [10]. Efficiently react against an attack, especially if this 
needs a change on an equipment configuration, often 
necessitates many checks that have to be performed in order to 
avoid bad side effects (conflict creation, services stability, etc.) 
 
Figure 1.  Policy regulation 
Consequently, policy regulation’s automation needs in one 
hand the existence of a hierarchy between the rules in case of 
multiple choices due to multiple attacks, and in second hand an 
automatic method to validate the policy’s modifications. At the 
business level, the targeted foreseen solution will be able to 
improve the resilience to attacks of core IP networks and, by 
extension to large information systems, which form critical 
infrastructures for communication and services today. 
The second section of this paper introduced requirement 
that has to be taken into account for the definition the presented 
architecture, section III introduce the architecture and section 
IV illustrate it through a use case in telecommunication 
networks. 
II. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 
The architecture of such a reaction system must respect 
some classes of requirements that has been synthesized in the 
following: (TABLE I. )  
 
TABLE I.  REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS 
Requirement list Description 
Business needs Laws and regulations dedicated to private sector exist and are continuously improving requirements that enforce the top 
management to be responsible regarding the needs for information security (SOX, Basel 2, ISO27000).  
Corporate policy and security policies are tools under the cover of the business that face IS security issues. In that sense, 
security requirements are dictated by the business and IT staff implements them. 
Accordingly, a business requirement is: when an attack occurs, the technical IT committee adapts the basic policy to solve 
the problem. This emergency modification of the consign policy needs to be validated or improved by the policy business 
owner before being introduced in production. 
Scalability The system should be able to manage and ensure security of several sub-systems (e.g. LAN and subs-LAN) called 
“managed systems”. 
Availability There’s always in IT systems a single element, component, system, device, or person that is crucial for the mission and of 
course the security; these item are called “single points of failure” and the management system should avoid them. 
Confidence Current usage of automatic reaction technologies is narrowed by end-user confidence into the system. As a result, 
operators often deactivate automatic features of the system.  
Strong confidence can be established by design, ensuring that reaction don’t contravene known business policies. Besides, 
a confidence measure must be provided for each non-trivial process, where low confidence involves human support 
(Agreement, Manual investigation, Reaction selection). Thus the system should provide granularity in the automatic 
process. 
Autonomy However, certain autonomy should be provided to the managed systems, to avoid paralyzing situation in case of loss of 
connection with the global system.  This autonomy could enable the system on highly scalable network (as P2P or Ad-
Hoc networks) and specifically when a peer could be a managed system or part of it. 
Survivability and robustness The management system should implements means for being able to continue to function during and after a damage or 
loss due to intentional malicious threats (i.e. survivability), and unintentional hardware failures, human errors, etc.  (e.g. 
robustness). 
Reaction applicability A reaction should be applicable to several managed systems or to targeted objects. The reaction applicability should be 
specified and adaptable considering the reaction. Furthermore, a time defining the validity of the reaction should be 
specified (temporary reactions for a certain time, or permanent). 
Alert management correlation Relatively to the alerts management, a global correlation between the alerts coming from different managed systems 
should be realized. The existing intrusion detection tools generate alerts and the system just collect and process them, as 
observation input. The alert should be used immediately by the local level, for an rapid reaction but also in a second time 
for a more adapted reaction (if needed). 
Global supervision Furthermore, a global supervision (common to all the managed systems) must available in order to manage detection and 
reaction  (based on policy) on widely spread systems. Indeed, alerts from all the managed systems should be correlated 
together at the higher level of hierarchy. This supervision should be useful to check if the business policies are respected 
at both management levels. 
 
III. AGENT BASED POLICY MANAGEMENT 
ARCHITECTURE 
A. Overview and definitions 
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) is a system composed of 
several agents, capable of mutual interaction. The interaction 
can be in the form of message passing or producing changes in 
their common environment.  
Agents are pro-active, reactive and social autonomous 
entities able to exhibit organized activity, in order to meet their 
design objectives, by eventually interacting with users. Agent 
is collaborative by being able to commit itself to the society 
or/and another agent.  
An agent, like an object, encapsulates a state and a behavior 
and provide moreover a number of facilities that are ::  
• An agent has control on its behavior 
• An agent decides in which state it is, even if external 
event may influence this decision.. 
• An agent exerts this control in various manners 
(reactive, directed by goals, social) 
• MAS have several control flows while a system with 
objects has a priori only one control flow. 
The agents also have global behavior into the MAS, such 
as: 
• Cooperation: agents share the same goal 
• Collaboration: agents share intermittently the same 
goal, 
• Competition: incompatible goals between agents 
An architecture description has been developed considering 
the requirements described in the previous section. To manage 
several different systems, due to their location, the focused 
business domain or organization type, a distributed system is 
appropriate. Furthermore, a distributed solution should be able 
to bring some autonomy to the managed systems; robustness, 
survivability and availability are also impacted. 
The architecture will be composed of several components, 
called “nodes”, having different responsibilities. Theses nodes 
will be organized in two dimensions, as presented in Figure 2. . 
The vertical dimension, structured in layers relatively to the 
managed network organization,  allows adding abstraction in 
going upward. Indeed, the lowest layer will be close to the 
managed system and thus being the interface between the 
targeted network and the management system. The higher 
layer will expose a global view of the whole system and will 
be able to take some decisions based on a more complete 
knowledge of the system, business, and organization. 
Intermediate levels (1 to n-1) will guarantee flexibility and 
scalability to the architecture in order to consider management 
constraints of the targeted infrastructure. Those middleware 
levels are optional but allow the system to be better adapted to 
the complexity of a given organization and the size of the 
information system. 
Figure 2.  Architecture Overview  
The horizontal dimension, containing three basic components, 
is presented in Figure 3. and its three main phases are described 
below: 
1) Alert: Collect, normalize, correlate, analyze the alerts 
coming from the managed networks and representing an 
intrusion or an attack. If the alert is confirmed and coherent, it 
is forwarded to the reaction decision component. (Alert 
Correlation Engine-ACE). 
2) Reaction Decision: Receive confirmed alerts for which a 
reaction is expected. Considering the knowledge of: the policy, 
the systems organization and the specified behaviour, this 
component decide if a reaction is needed or not and define the 
reaction, if any. The reaction will be modification(s), 
addition(s) or removal(s) of current policy rules. (Police 
Instantiation Engine-PIE). 
3) Reaction: Instantiation and deployment of the new 
policies, on the targeted networks. The deployment  (Policy 
Deployment Point – PDP) and enforcement (Policy 
Enforcement Point – PEP) of these new policies, lead to a new 
security state of the network. The terminology in italic used in 
this section 4 is extracted from both: XACML [9] and OrBAC 
Model [11]. 
 
 
Figure 3.  The three basic components 
An issue is raised considering which layer will be allowed 
to take a decision reaction: only one layer, two, several or all? 
If more than one layer can trigger a reaction on the same 
object(s), there will be a conflict issue. Thus, the system should 
be able to provide mechanisms to solve conflicts between 
several selected reactions. Another issue concerns the 
agreement: at which level should it be asked? : A solution 
could be to ask it at the same level (or at an upper one) that the 
reaction decision is made, this should be specified by the user. 
A possible solution is a distributed, vertically layered and 
hierarchical architecture. The layer's number could be adapted 
according to the organization of the managed systems. In our 
case, three layers are sufficient (local, intermediate and global). 
The reaction system is composed of three main parts: the alert 
management part, the reaction part and the police definition-
deployment part. Three trees (alert, reaction and policy) could 
be placed side by side, as presented in Figure 2. These trees are 
the same but their nodes have different functions. The alert tree 
collects the alerts with the local nodes and correlate them in 
several steps, one step by layer. A certain response time is used 
by the system from the intrusion detection to the reaction 
application. This time is increased if the reaction process is 
propagated to the upper layers, as presented in Figure 4. A 
global goal is of course to shorten it. 
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Figure 4.  Response time. 
The next step of our research development is firstly the 
definition of a reaction engine that encompass both architecture 
components defined in that paper and communication engine 
between these components. This engine will be based on a 
message format and on a message exchange protocol based on 
standards such as [12]. Secondly, real cases must be studied in 
order to experiment with the architecture and its associated 
protocol. 
The message format will be defined in XML format and 
will be structured around a number of attributes that will 
specify the message source, the message destination and the 
message type (alert, reaction, policy request, policy 
modification, policy modification validation, decision and 
synchronization). The protocol will define the exchange format 
and the workflow of messages between the architecture 
components. It will encompass a set a rules governing the 
syntax, semantics, and synchronization of communication. In 
the section relating to technical requirements, we have seen 
that nodes structure must be flexible in order to be able to 
reorganize itself if a node fails or disappears. Each node must 
also be autonomous in order to permit reorganization. Given 
these requirements, we think that the use of Multi-Agents 
Systems is a solution to provide autonomy, flexibility and 
decision mechanisms to each node by representing them by 
agents.  
As studied in the state of the art presented in [4], a set of 
agents could be managed and controlled through an 
organization. An organization is a set of agents playing roles, 
gathered in a normative structure and expecting to achieve 
some global and local objectives. Several models like the roles 
model, the tasks model, the interaction model, the norms 
models etc specify an organization.  
In our context we need an interaction definition in order to 
specify communication protocols between agents representing 
nodes. We also need roles in order to specify what agent will 
have to communicate or act in order to detect intrusions and 
then react. Based on this needs, the use of an electronic 
institution based on agents is one of the possibilities that we 
will investigate. 
The main goal of the reaction policy enforcement engine is 
to apply policies in terms of specific concrete rules on 
“technical” devices (firewall, fileserver, and other systems 
named PEP). For that, we need means to make PIE, PDP and 
PEP interacting and collaborating. As we will see in the 
following section, the multi-agents systems concept already 
defines architectures and models for autonomous agents’ 
organization and interaction. Existing platform like JADE 
(Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) [18][19] implements 
agents’ concepts as well as their ability to communicate by 
exchanging messages and could simplify the reaction 
components integration. This is the solution, which is detailed 
hereafter. Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) 
[16], promotes the success of emerging agent-based 
applications, services and equipment. Making available in a 
timely manner, internationally agreed specifications that 
maximize interoperability across agent-based applications, 
services and equipment pursues this goal. This is realized 
through the open international collaboration of member 
organizations, which are companies and universities active in 
the agent field. FIPA's specifications are publicly available. 
They are not a technology for a specific application, but 
generic technologies for different application areas, and not just 
independent technologies but a set of basic technologies that 
can be integrated by developers to make complex systems with 
a high degree of interoperability. 
The multi-agent framework that will be used her is JADE. 
We base ourselves on a survey made in [15] to argue that this 
agent platform responds to the expectations in terms of agents' 
functionalities, security, safe communication between agents, 
performance and standardization. 
The following sections present the specification of the 
policy enforcement engine deployment based on agents. After 
motivating this solution, we introduce agents and multi-agents 
theory and we detail the Policy Enforcement Point, Policy 
Decision Point and the communications between them. 
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Figure 5.  Multi-Agent System based enforcement process deployment 
B. Policy Enforcement Point 
We consider here the flow starting with a set of new 
policies to apply on physical PEP. We also consider that the 
main components of the “policy enforcement architecture” 
(PIE, PDP and PEP) are composed of an agent (or more) as 
depicted on Figure 5. The PIE decides to apply new policies. 
Its PIE Agent sends the policies to the PDP Agent, which 
decides which PEP is able to implement policies in terms of 
rules or script on devices (firewall, fileserver, etc,). Then, the 
PDP Agent sends to PEP Agent of which PEP are concerned 
by their corresponding policies. Finally, each PEP Agent 
knowing how transforming a policy into a rule or script 
understandable by the device interfaced implements the policy. 
Consequently, agents do not represent only PDP but each 
component of a node (in the enforcement loop at least). This 
solution provides a multi-agent framework making possible 
agents cooperating and communicating between them. 
C.  Policy Decision Point  
Figure 5.  represents the PDP architecture composed by 
several modules. For the multi-agent system point of view, the 
Component Configuration Mapper results from the interaction 
between the PDP Agent and the Facilitator Agent while the 
Policy Analysis module is realized by the PDP Agent. The 
Facilitator manages the network topology by retrieving PEP 
Agents according to their localization (devices registered with 
IP address or MAC address) or according to actions they could 
apply and their type (firewall, file server, etc.). For that the 
Facilitator uses white pages and yellow pages services. The 
JADE platform already provides implemented facilitator and 
searching services. Besides, the use of a multi-agent system as 
the framework provides flexibility, openness and 
heterogeneity. Actually, when we decide to add a new PEP, we 
just have to provide its PEP Agent able to concretely apply the 
policies that will register itself through the Facilitator that will 
update databases. 
D. Communication specifications using Jade 
JADE is a software framework fully implemented in Java 
language. It simplifies the implementation of multi-agent 
systems through a middleware, which is FIPA compliant. The 
agent platform can be distributed across machines (which not 
even need to share the same OS) and the configuration can be 
controlled via a remote GUI. JADE ensures standard 
compliance through a comprehensive set of system services 
and agents in compliance with the FIPA specifications: naming 
service and yellow-page service, message transport and parsing 
service, and a library of FIPA interaction protocols ready to be 
used. 
 
 
Figure 6.  FIPA-ACL Overview 
The AMS (Agent Management System) provides the 
naming service (i.e. ensures that each agent in the platform has 
a unique name) and represents the authority in the platform (for 
instance it is possible to create/kill agents on remote containers 
by requesting that to the AMS). The DF (Directory Facilitator) 
provides a Yellow Pages service by means of which an agent 
can find other agents providing the services he requires in order 
to achieve his goals. The ACC (Agent Communication 
Channel) is a high-level interface, through which messages are 
sent using a MTP (Message Transport Protocol). FIPA-ACL 
[17] is the standardization of ACLs developed by FIPA. ACLs 
(Agent Communication Languages) are high level languages 
based on speech acts (inform, request. cfp, agree, understood, 
...) in order to establish collaboration, negotiation etc. A 
message written by using an ACL describes a desired state 
instead of procedure or method call. ACLs are based on low-
level languages for messages transportation (SMTP, TCP/IP, 
IIOP, HTTP).  
FIPA-ACL messages are structured among other things 
with performatives (type of communication acts), sender, 
receiver, content, a language in which the content is expressed 
and an ontology used to give sense to symbols used in the 
content expression. For instance, Agent A (the sender) can 
send a FIPA-ACL message to Agent B (the receiver) 
requesting (use of performative request) something (content of 
the message) in language SPL by respecting the protocol 
“policyApply”. We choose SPL [7] to represent policies within 
the agent platform. Therefore, the content of the message will 
be a XML file defining the policy to apply. The full FIPA 
communication model is implemented in JADE and its 
components have been clearly distinct and fully integrated: 
interaction protocols, envelope, ACL, content languages, 
encoding schemes, ontologies and, finally, transport protocols. 
The transport mechanism, in particular, is like a chameleon 
because it adapts to each situation, by transparently choosing 
the best available protocol. Java RMI, event-notification, 
HTTP, and IIOP are currently used, but more protocols can be 
easily added via the MTP and IMTP JADE interfaces. Inside 
this platform, a communication support is defined and agents 
communicate by exchanging messages structured in 
accordance with the FIPA-ACL formalism. As mentioned 
before, the full FIPA communication model is implemented in 
JADE. Being composed by agents, PIE, PDP and PEP are able 
to communicate by exchanging messages. As a consequence, 
using an agent platform as JADE is in concurrency with other 
PDP-PEP communications protocols and has the advantage to 
already been implemented. A multi-agent system is a solution 
to make the reaction components communicating and 
collaborating without defining specific communication 
techniques. 
IV. RESUTS 
A. Use case  
Our use case focuses on accessing files through 
telecommunication networks where we have to apply access or 
restriction, in writing, reading and executing rights on a file. To 
achieve that, the mechanism is based on the real application of 
the access rights permission on a file server for a specific user, 
under Windows and Linux environment.  
Jade environments are called containers. Typically, in a 
multi-agent application, there will be several containers (with 
agents) running on different machines. The first container 
started must be the main container that maintains a central 
registry of all the others in order to permit that agents discover 
and interact with each other. 
After the platform start, the following operations are 
executed: 
1) PIE registers with its IP address to the main 
container. 
2) PDP registers with its IP address to a container of the 
main container. 
3) PEP also registers with its IP address to another 
container of the main container. 
4) The policy is send to the PIE. 
5) PDP receives the message (policy) from the PIE. 
6) The PDP knows all PEP services, and according to 
this, it identifies and sends the policy to the right 
PEP. 
7) The PEP parses the policy in order to remove 
necessary element for the mapping. 
8) The PEP then mapped the policy to a specific 
execution command (setfacl). 
9) The policy is finally applied.  
 
The PEP will afterward send node after node to the console, 
through the communication channel the state of the policy 
application and whether or not it is successfully applied. The 
dash lines with OK annotation illustrate it on Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.  Use case mechanism 
Practically, concerning our prototype, for a sample of the 
DTD (Document Type Definition), we have: 
 
<!DOCTYPE POLICY[ 
 
<!--Object--> 
 
<!ELEMENT object (target,path)> 
<!ELEMENT target href #PCDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT path  #PCDATA> 
 
<!--Subjects--> 
 
<!ELEMENT subject(uid?,role*,group*)> 
<!ELEMENT uid  (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT role (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT group  (#PCDATA)> 
 
<!--Actions--> 
 
<!ELEMENT action (parameter*, provision*)> 
<!ATTLIST action name (read¦write¦create¦delete) #REQUIRED 
   permission(grant¦deny) 
#REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT provisional_action(parameter*)> 
<!ATTLIST provisional_action name #CDATA #REQUIRED 
timing(before¦after) "after"> 
 
<!--Condition--> 
 <!ELEMENT condition  ANY> 
 
<!--Policy--> 
<!ELEMENT policy   (property?,xacl*,policyType+)> 
<!ELEMENT xacl   (object+,rule+)> 
<!ELEMENT rule   (acl)+> 
<!ELEMENT acl   (subject*,privilege+,condition?)> 
<!ELEMENT policyType (#PCDATA) 
<!ELEMENT property  (propagation?,conflict-resolution?,default?)> 
<!ELEMENT propagation EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST propagation read(no¦up¦down) "down" 
        write(no¦up¦down) "down" 
        create(no¦up¦down) "down" 
        delete(no¦up¦down) "up"> 
<!ELEMENT conflict-resolution EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST conflict-resolution read(dtp¦ptp¦ntp) "dtp"  
         write(dtp¦ptp¦ntp) "dtp" 
         create(dtp¦ptp¦ntp) "dtp" 
         delete(dtp¦ptp¦ntp) "dtp"> 
<!ELEMENT default EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST default read (grant¦denial) "denial" 
    write (grant¦denial) "denial" 
    create (grant¦denial) "denial" 
    delete(grant¦denial) "denial">  ]> 
 
This rule is written according to the DTD provided above 
and based on the access control language. 
<policy> 
  <policyType>FileServer</policyType> 
  <xacl> 
    <object> 
    <object> 
 <target>text.txt</target> 
 <path>/tmp</path> 
 </object> 
 </object> 
       <rule> 
        <acl> 
            <subject> 
                       <uid>bob</uid> 
  <roles><role>Administrator</role></roles> 
            </subject> 
            <action name="read" permission="grant"/> 
            <action name="write" permission="grant"/> 
            <action name="execute" permission="deny"/> 
        </acl> 
    </rule> 
</xacl> 
</policy> 
 
By applying the mentioned above policy, the administrator 
called Bob receives the permission to read and write on a given 
file (“TEST:TXT” in our case) located in a given directory 
(“TMP” in our case). However, the permission to execute the 
file is denied. 
The approach presented here is based on a system that uses 
(1) multi agents’ architecture, (2) the access rights permission 
on a file server, (3) the use case mechanism, (4) the policy’s 
DTD, and (4) a policy example.  
B. Implementation 
The common package is composed of GenericAgent and 
MASPlatform classes. This package is necessary for all other 
packages. The application initializes service registration and 
deregistration into the directory facilitator. Then a PIE’s agent 
registers into the main container and the other agents into the 
same or other containers. During the initialization and before 
starting the platform, it also checks if the configuration 
parameters are correct. 
The following platform’s configuration settings are 
verified: 
• The name of the host where the main-container should 
listen 
• The Port number where the main-container should 
listen for other containers. 
• The platform-id. 
• The Container local port number. 
• The local port number. 
• The local hosts IP address. 
Figure 8. shows the two main classes used during the 
application implementation. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Common package class diagram 
• Parsing 
With the “JDOM” libraries, we implement a policy parsing 
class, which receives a XML policy file and extract the needed 
elements as for example the target, the action and the privileges 
concerning the policy to be applied 
• Mapping 
Policy rules are mapped to real commands. According to 
our use case, the prototype is focused on the Linux 
environment so as the kernel handles access right on files via 
ACL option. 
• Linux ACLs  
With this model, it is possible to give or restrict rights on a 
file. Basically, in the Linux environment, rights are given to the 
user, to the group to who belongs the file or to the other. But 
with the ACL’s we can expand the right to a number of users 
and groups. Setfacl and getfacl are the basic ACL commands. 
Setfacl sets the rights by using the mounted ACL option of the 
kernel. Example: 
setfacl –m u:Geronimo :rw,g :red :r-x,o:---  ./test.txt 
 
This example enables read and write rights to the user 
Geronimo; it enables read and execute rights to the red group 
and finally no rights to the other. It is the setfacl command that 
we have implemented in our command mapping class. Getfacl 
shows the user, the group and the other files access right 
values. According to the version of the kernel used, we enabled 
the kernel to support Access Control List (ACL) by mounting 
the ACL option in the partition containing the files on which 
we want to extend rights. The policy java package creates and 
manages a vector with many policy rules. Each policy rule is a 
Hash Table and each Hash Table is characterized by its key 
and value. The Hash Table’s keys are the XML tags and their 
values are the corresponding attributes. This package through 
its classes gets all the characteristics of the policy to be applied. 
The elements like the action, the policy rule and the policy type 
are extracted from the parsed policy file. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented an architecture developed 
for an incident reaction system based on policy. As explained 
in section 4, the main advantage of this architecture is its 
distributed structure. Moreover, the architecture covers the 
requirements needs described in section II. The future works of 
our achievements will be the specification of a protocol, 
specification of the messages and thus the reaction 
methodology. This protocol and methodology will be dedicated 
to the architecture presented in this paper and should reply to 
the issues raised in this paper.  
We have tested our approach in many configurations. For 
example, we launched each node of the application on a 
different machine of the test bed network. And it works: by this 
we proved the distributed property of the application. Figure 30 
represents the basic case where all agents are launched on a 
single machine. As it is shown on this figure, the host IP 
address and the local host IP address are the same (127.0.0.1) 
For the testing phase we made independently, executable 
.jar files for each agent. They are composed as followed: 
The PIE agent is composed of: The common (setting, 
starting the platform), the configfiles (platform’s configuration 
files), the lib (libraries, jar files used by JADE), and the PIE 
packages. 
The PDP agent is composed of: The common (setting, 
starting the platform), the configfiles (platform’s configuration 
files), the lib (libraries, jar files used by JADE), the policyfiles 
(policy parsing class) and the PDP packages. The PEP agent is 
composed of: The common (setting, starting the platform), the 
configfiles (platform’s configuration files), the lib(libraries, jar 
files used by JADE), the policy(policy mapping , policy 
execution command class) and the PEP packages. The 
following figure, represents the PIE, PDP, PEP agents running. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Leonard J. LaPadula. "State of the Art in Anomaly Detection and 
Reaction" Technical Report MP 99B0000020, Mitre, July 1999. 
[2] G.L.F. Santos, Z. Abdelouahab, R.A. Dias, C.F.L. Lima, E. Nascimento 
(Brazil), E.M. Cochra. "An Automated Response Approach for Intrusion 
Detection Security Enhancement" in Proceedings of Software 
Engineering and Applications (SEA), 2003. 
[3] M. Petkac and L. Badger" Security agility in response to intrusion 
detection" in 16th Annual Conference on Computer Security 
Applications (ACSAC '00), 2000. 
[4] B. Gâteau. Modélisation et Supervision d'Institutions Multi-Agents. 
Ph.D. Thesis, Ecole Supérieure des Mines de Saint-Etienne, 2007. 
[5] Christophe Feltus, Djamel Khadraoui, Benoît de Rémont and André 
Rifaut, Business Gouvernance based Policy regulation for Security 
Incident Response. Centre de Recherche Public Henri Tudor, 
Luxembourg. 2007. IEEE GIIS 2007 Global Infrastructure Symposium, 
6 July 2007. 
[6] A. Rifaut and C. Feltus, Improving Operational Risk Management 
Systems by Formalizing the Basel II Regulation with Goal Models and 
the ISO/IEC 15504 Approach, Proceeding, REMO2V'2006, 
International Workshop on Regulations Modelling and their Validation 
& Verification, to be held in conjunction with the 18th Conference on 
Advanced Information System Engineering (CAiSE'06), 6 June 2006, 
Luxembourg. 
[7] Security Policy Language : http://www.positif.org/ispl.html  
[8] Cuppens, F., Cuppens-Boulahia, N., Miège, A.: Inheritance hierarchies 
in the Or-BAC Model and application in a network environment. In: 
Second Foundations of Computer Security Workshop (FCS’04), Turku, 
Finland (2004). 
[9] http://xml.coverpages.org/draft-seitz-netconf-xacml-00.txt 
[10] H. Debar, Y. Thomas, N. Boulahia-Cuppens, F. Cuppens; Using 
contextual security policies for threat response. Third GI International 
Conference on Detection of Intrusions & Malware, and Vulnerability 
Assessment (DIMVA). Germany. Juillet 2006. 
[11] F. Cuppens and A. Miège, Modelling contexts in the Or-BAC model, 
19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Las Vegas, 
December, 2003 
[12] IDMEF/RFC4765, Network Working Group: Hervé Debar, France 
Telecom; D. Curry, Guardian; B. Feinstein,  SecureWorks, Inc.; March 
2007 
[13] http://www.rfc-archive.org/getrfc.php?rfc=4765. 
[14] N. Damianou, N. Dulay, E. Lupu, M. Sloman , The Ponder Policy 
Specification Language Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems 
and Networks (Policy2001), HP Labs Bristol, 29-31. Springer-Verlag. 
[15] E. Bulut, D. Khadraoui, and B. Marquet, Multi-Agent based Security 
Assurance Monitoring System for Telecommunication Infrastructures in 
Communication, Network, and Information Security conference (CNIS 
2007), Berkeley, California, USA, september 2007. 
[16] FIPA, http://www.fipa.org/ 
[17] FIPA, “Agent Communication Language“, FIPA Specification, 
November 1997 
[18] Fabio Bellifemine, Agostino Poggi, Giovanni Rimassa. JADE - A FIPA-
compliant agent framework, CSELT internal technical report. Part of 
this report has been also published in Proceedings of  PAAM'99, 
London, April 1999, pp.97-108 
[19] F. Bellifemine, G. Caire, A. Poggi, G. Rimassa, JADE - A White Paper. 
Sept. 2003 
 
 
